LEE et al. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., 272 Ga. 583, 533 S.E.2.d 82 (2000)
Linked as:
Text
Lanham & McGehee, William C. Lanham, Clark H. McGehee, for appellants.
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Lee v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,
The relevant facts are set forth by the Court of Appeals. Bridget Lee and her daughter sustained significant physical injuries in an automobile collision caused by an unknown hit-and-run driver. Lee witnessed her daughter's suffering, which ended with her daughter's death an hour later. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Allstate Insurance Company, Lee's and her husband's uninsured motorist carriers, paid the policy limits for the claim of the daughter's wrongful death. Lee filed suit to recover for her own physical injuries and for the emotional distress that she experienced from witnessing her daughter's suffering and death. Her husband sued for loss of consortium. State Farm intervened on its own behalf and Allstate defended in the "John Doe" name of the unknown motorist. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Lee's claim for emotional distress. Based on OB-GYN Assoc. of Albany v. Littleton, 261 Ga. 664 (410 SE2d 121) (1991) ("Littleton IV"), and its statement of Georgia's impact rule, a majority of the Court of Appeals found that Lee's claim was not actionable and affirmed.
I. Georgia's Impact Rule -- History, Current Law.
Georgia's impact rule is succinctly stated in Ryckeley v. Callaway, 261 Ga. 828 (412 SE2d 826) (1992): "In a claim concerning negligent conduct, a recovery for emotional distress is allowed only where there is some impact on the plaintiff, and that impact must be a physical injury." [2] The doctrine has a long history with its origins in Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
Notes:
3. The Court also reiterated "that for a pecuniary loss to support a claim for damages for emotional distress, the pecuniary loss must occur as a result of a tort involving an injury to the person even though this injury may not be physical." Littleton II at 667 (B).
4. Littleton IV adopted footnote 1 from the Court of Appeals opinion in Littleton III.
5. The "zone of danger" rule generally provides for recovery of damages for serious emotional distress from witnessing serious/fatal injury to a third person (usually a loved one) if the plaintiff (usually a relative) was within the range of physical peril from the defendant's negligence. Littleton II at 667 (C); Pieters v. B-Right Trucking, 669 FSupp. 1463, 1466 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Saechao v. Matsakoun, 717 P2d 165, 168 (Or. 1986).
6. This test has its roots in the seminal California case, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-741 (441 P2d 912) (1968).
7. In the more than three decades of dealing with its decision in Dillon v. Legg, the California courts have acknowledged the necessity of setting limitations on the recovery of bystander emotional distress based upon an analysis of reasonable foreseeability. In 1989, a majority of the California Supreme Court in Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644 (771 P2d 814)
8. To the extent that the Littleton cases, their predecessors, and progeny bar recovery for the parent's claim of emotional distress in circumstances like the present by requiring that the emotional distress stem from the parent's own physical injury, they will no longer be followed.
Sponsored links
