LUMPKIN v. JOHNSON et al., 270 Ga. 392, 509 S.E.2.d 621

Supreme Court of Georgia

Status: DECIDED

Docket Number: S98A1444

Parts: CARLEY, Justice.

Linked as:

Summary

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J., who dissent.

Summary

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J., who dissent.

Text

Jackson & Schiavone, G. Terry Jackson, Michael Mears, Gerard B. Kleinrock, for appellant.

After the grand jury of Richmond County indicted William Lumpkin for murder, a related civil action was filed against him in Columbia County. The criminal case was assigned to a trial judge by the Chief Judge of the Augusta Judicial Circuit, acting pursuant to a discretionary procedure adopted by a majority of the superior court judges of that circuit. Lumpkin filed suit, seeking writs of mandamus and prohibition to compel the clerks of the respective superior courts to appoint the same judge to preside over both the criminal and civil cases. In seeking the issuance of these extraordinary legal remedies, Lumpkin relied upon Rules 3.1 and 3.2 of the Uniform Superior Court Rules (Rules) which provide, in relevant part, that,

[i]n multi-judge circuits, unless a majority of the judges in a circuit elect to adopt a different system, all actions, civil and criminal, shall be assigned by the clerk of each superior court according to a plan approved by such judges to the end that each judge is allocated an equal number of cases. . . . When practical, all actions involving substantially the same parties, or substantially the same subject matter, or substantially the same factual issues, whether pending simultaneously or not, shall be assigned to the same judge.

The trial court, sitting by designation, found no merit in Lumpkin's claim and dismissed his petition. From that order, Lumpkin brings this appeal.

1. At the outset, we note that Rule 3.1 does not authorize the clerk to establish a method of case assignment for a multi-judge circuit. Under that Rule, the clerk has only the administrative responsibility of implementing the method of allocating cases adopted by a majority of the judges in the circuit. Moreover, it is clear that the judges themselves are not required to approve a method which results in the equal assignment of cases, since Rule 3.1 specifies that a majority of the judges in a multi-judge circuit can adopt an entirely "different" system. Under that Rule, "a case-assignment system in multi-judge circuits whereunder each judge is allocated an equal number of cases, is subject to the approval or modification of a majority of the judges in the circuit. [Cit.]" Cobb County v. Campbell, 256 Ga. 519, 520 (350 SE2d 466) (1986). Here, a majority of the judges has elected to adopt such a different system, whereby the Chief Judge, rather than the clerk, assigns capital cases on a basis which does not result in an equal allocation of such cases among them. The issue for resolution is whether this method of case assignment adopted in the Augusta Judicial Circuit was properly used to assign a judge to preside over the murder case against Lumpkin.

According to Lumpkin, the case assignment procedure followed by the judges is invalid for lack of prior approval by this Court. He relies upon Rule 1.2 (B), which specifies that such rules of a superior court as deviate from the Rules must first be filed with the clerk of this Court and will not take effect until 30 days after our approval. However, there is no Rule from which the case assignment method adopted by the judges deviates in any substantive manner. Indeed, Rule 3.1 specifically authorizes the judges to make their own determination as to the applicable case assignment method for the Augusta Judicial Circuit, and that Rule imposes no condition of prior approval by this Court. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the Judges is entirely consistent with the mandate of Rule 3.1. Cobb County v. Campbell, supra.

Moreover, by letter unanimously approved by this Court and entered on its minutes on December 16, 1997, this Court recognized that the case assignment method used in the Augusta Judicial Circuit is not a substantive matter controlled by the Rules, but is, instead, an internal operating procedure which does not require our prior approval. This action of the Court was based on Rule 1.2 (C), which provides that rules of a superior court which relate only to its internal procedure and do not affect the rights of any party, substantially or materially, require no prior approval by this Court. That Rule further defines such internal operating procedures as those which "relate to case management, administration, and operation of the court . . . ." This general definition of internal operating procedure clearly incorporates the method of assignment of cases adopted by a majority of the judges. See Cobb County v. Campbell, supra.

The only applicable requirement is stated in Rules 1.2 (G) and 3.4, which provide that the rules establishing the method of case assignment for a circuit must be published to the local bar, and be filed with the respective clerks and this Court. Because the assignment method adopted by the judges was not on file with this Court at the time the murder case was assigned, there has not been full compliance with the procedural requirements of Rules 1.2 (G) and 3.4. However, Lumpkin has not shown that the lack of prior filing with this Court constitutes harmful error. See Edwards v. State, 219 Ga. App. 239, 246 (6) (464 SE2d 851) (1995). Giving retroactive effect to that unfiled assignment method will not deprive Lumpkin of any vested right, since he has no right at all to have his murder case assigned in accordance with any particular procedure. The judges, in their capacity as members of the judiciary, have the inherent authority to determine their own internal operating procedure for the selection of which of them shall hear cases in the Augusta Judicial Circuit. Cobb County v. Campbell, supra. Of course, the trial judge who is selected in accordance with the procedure adopted by the Judges must comport with the Due Process Clause guarantee of fairness and impartiality. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57, 62 (93 SC 80, 34 LE2d 267) (1972). However, that constitutional right is fully protected by the post-assignment procedure available to Lumpkin for seeking the recusal or disqualification of any trial judge assigned to preside over the murder case if he wishes to question the fairness and impartiality of the assigned judge. Rule 25. Thus, the trial court correctly held that there was no basis for the issuance of writs of mandamus or prohibition in connection with the method used to assign the murder case against him.

Clearly, nothing in Tokars v. Superior Court of Cobb County, 264 Ga. 180, 181 (442 SE2d 454) (1994) holds that, in order for a case assignment system to comply with Rule 3.1, it must ensure an equal allocation of cases in a multi-judge circuit. The method of case assignment employed in Tokars was in conformity with the general mandate of Rule 3.1 that, "unless a majority of the judges in a circuit elect to adopt a different system," cases are to be allocated equally. In direct contrast, the method at issue here is in accordance with that express exception to the general mandate of Rule 3.1. As we held in Cobb County v. Campbell, supra at 520, Rule 3.1 specifically authorizes a majority of the judges to adopt a method which does not allocate an equal number of cases to each judge. Although Rule 3.1 provides that "all persons are directed to refrain from attempting to affect such assignment in any way," a Chief Judge who makes assignments in accordance with a method specifically approved by a majority of the other judges is clearly not such a "person." See Cobb County v. Campbell, supra at 520. The Chief Judge is acting in an official, not a personal, capacity when making case assignments pursuant to an approved system.

Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. V. of the Georgia Constitution does not require a random and equal distribution of cases among the judges of a multi-judge circuit. That constitutional provision merely "requires certain uniformity among 'courts.' The term 'court' refers to the entire court, and not to the judge or judges of the court. [Cit.]" Cobb County v. Campbell, supra at 520. Thus, the case assignment method in effect in the Augusta Judicial Circuit is constitutional because it "is such as could be adopted by each local court under its inherent power to control its own internal administration to promote flexibility and efficiency, subject only to limitations of uniform rules, statute, or the Constitution." Cobb County v. Campbell, supra at 520.

Likewise, Rule 1.2 has no bearing here, since it relates to this Court's prior approval of rules which deviate from the Rules. The method of case allocation in the Augusta Circuit does not deviate from any Rule. To the contrary, that method complies in all substantive respects with the Rules, in that it has been approved by a majority of the judges in the Augusta Judicial Circuit as specifically authorized by Rule 3.1. Indeed, that method was submitted to this Court pursuant to Rule 1.2 and, because it clearly was an internal operating procedure not governed by the Rules, this Court unanimously found that our prior approval under Rule 1.2 was unnecessary.

2. Rule 3.2 is not mandatory "inasmuch as that rule provides that companion cases should be assigned to the same trial judge only 'when practical.' " Tokars v. Superior Court of Cobb County, supra at 181. Therefore, mandamus will not lie to control or direct the exercise of the discretionary authority under Rule 3.2 to assign a case to a specific trial judge. See Richmond County v. Steed, 264 Ga. 180, 181 (442 SE2d 454) (1994).

1998

Notes:

4. See Ga. Const. (1983), Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. V. ("[T]he courts of each class shall have uniform jurisdiction, powers, rules of practice and procedure, and selection, qualifications, terms and discipline of judges.").

5. See discussion in Division 2, supra.

6. Furthermore, at the time the December 1997 letter was issued, this Court was aware that the present matter would soon be before it on appeal, and may well have wished to forestall final analysis of the Augusta Circuit's local rules until the parties had been afforded ample opportunity to present their respective arguments.

7. USCR 1.2 (c).

8. In support of its conclusion that the Augusta Circuit's Local Rule for the assignment of cases is an "internal operating procedure," the majority relies upon this Court's decision In Cobb County v. Campbell, 256 Ga. 519, 520 (350 SE2d 466) (1986). That reliance, however is misplaced, as the Campbell decision addressed only the constitutionality of a non-uniform case assignment method, and specifically recognized that the case-assignment system at issue in that case was "subject . . . to limitations of [the] uniform rules." 256 Ga. at 520.

9. Op. at 395.

10. See OCGA 1-3-1.

11. Id. 12. New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 2317 (1993).

13. See Barlow v. Story, 120 Ga. App. 48 (169 SE2d 660) (1969) (party must clearly establish basis for claiming exemption from statute or rule). See also Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp. v. Roach, 267 Ga. 619 (480 SE2d 595) (1997).