MOORE v. THOMPSON., 255 Ga. 236, 336 S.E.2.d 749 (1985)
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Summary
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur, except Marshall, P. J., Clarke and Smith, JJ., who dissent.
Summary
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur, except Marshall, P. J., Clarke and Smith, JJ., who dissent.
Text
James E. Butler, Jr., Robert D. Cheeley, for appellee.Murray & Temple, William D. Temple, William D. Strickland, for appellant.
We granted certiorari to determine whether, in a civil action for damages arising out of the use of an automobile in which the cause of the injuries is alleged to be driving while intoxicated, evidence is admissible on the issue of punitive damages that the defendant had pled guilty to driving while intoxicated twice before, and twice after, the injuries in issue. Thompson v. Moore,
Thompson suffered personal injuries when Moore's car crossed the road and struck Thompson while he was jogging. Moore pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol. Thompson then sued Moore. At trial the court admitted evidence of the defendant's four guilty pleas but later declared a mistrial because of the prejudicial impact of such evidence. On interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had erred in granting the mistrial insofar as the first two of the defendant's guilty pleas were concerned. Two judges of that court would allow evidence as to the subsequent guilty pleas as well. Thompson, supra.
At the outset it should be noted that we are dealing here with the admission of evidence on the issue of punitive damages. Hence, nothing said herein relates to the admissibility of evidence on the issue of liability, to impeach a witness, or as to any other matter. [1]
Our Code, OCGA
In Southern R. Co. v. O'Bryan,
SMITH, Justice, dissenting.
Courts allow juries to award damages to plaintiffs for a number of reasons. First, juries award damages to plaintiffs to compensate them for harm caused by the defendant. In other situations, such as Federal Rule 23 (b) (3) class actions, juries award damages for widespread low-level harm to compensate injured plaintiffs, and, primarily, to deter wrongdoers from attempting to profit from activities that harm a large number of people in such a small way that no individual harmed can afford to bring a lawsuit. OCGA
We should not apply punitive damages where the law provides other measures by which society may punish wrongdoers. The legislature provides for uniform punishment of criminal behavior, and in doing so, it speaks for the general public. Each award of punitive damages, on the other hand, constitutes an individual determination of appropriate punishment which speaks for the conscience of a group of twelve almost randomly selected citizens, and which may vary wildly from other awards in similar factual situations.
Where, as here, the requested damages do not relate to the plaintiff's injury, and the legislature, in enacting a criminal statute, has provided a deterrent to the defendant's conduct, we should not place the bludgeon of punitive damages in the hands of a jury.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Marshall and Justice Clarke join in this dissent.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia --
Alton D. Kitchings, Manley F. Brown, Charles R. Adams III, amicus curiae.
Notes:
1. Regarding the admissibility of other transactions and occurrences on the issue of liability, see Wright v. Dilbeck,
2. "Separate trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues."
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