Summary
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Summary
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Text
Eichholz & Hunter, Thomas M. Hunter, Bruce A. Howe, for appellants.
Plaintiff is a resident and property owner in the unincorporated area of Chatham County. In 1973 the county created a special service tax district which consists of the unincorporated area of the county, and it levies a special service district tax on property located therein. Chatham County uses its proceeds from the local option sales tax, OCGA
Plaintiff filed suit to enjoin Chatham County from using local option sales tax proceeds to reduce the countywide general maintenance and operation tax, and for other purposes. The trial court granted summary judgment for the county on the use of the sales tax proceeds to reduce the general maintenance and operation tax countywide and denied summary judgment for both parties on the remaining issues. The taxpayer appeals contending that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the county, and the county cross appeals claiming error in the denial of summary judgment on the remaining issues.
1. Plaintiff contends that the county is required by Art. 9, Sec. 2, Par. 3 (Code Ann. 2-4903) (Const. 1983; former Art IX, Sec. IV, Par. II, Const. 1976 (Code Ann. 2-6102)), and OCGA
That constitutional provision, now Art. 9, Sec. 2, Par. 3 (Code Ann. 2-4903), provides that "In addition to and supplementary of all powers possessed by or conferred upon any county, municipality, or any combination thereof, any county, municipality, or any combination thereof may exercise the following powers and provide the following services: . . ." (Former Art. IX, Sec. IV, Par. II (Code Ann. 2-6102), contained essentially the same language). There follows a list of a dozen or more powers and services, but the words "maintenance" and "operation" do not appear therein (except that the word "maintenance" appears in conjunction with streets and roads). The constitution provides further that such powers and services shall not be performed by a county within a city, and vice versa, except by contract or as provided by local or special law (former provision) or except by contract or as provided by law (new provision).
Plaintiff argues that because OCGA
At the outset we perceive a difference between the special district created by Chatham County (the unincorporated area) in 1973 and the special district created by the local option sales tax act. OCGA
Next, without deciding whether local option sales taxes may be expended in exercising powers "possessed by or conferred upon" counties (see quote from Art. 9, Sec. 2, Par. 3 (Code Ann. 2-4903), supra) by provisions other than the constitutional provision cited, we find that the General Assembly has expressly provided how the local option sales tax shall be applied to taxes (as opposed to expenditures). OCGA
We find taxpayer's argument to be deficient in that it fails to take into account the statutory definition of "special district" and more particularly in that it fails to take into account the difference between allowable expenditures of tax funds, see Salem v. Tattnall County,
1984
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