SELF v. CITY OF ATLANTA et al., 259 Ga. 78, 377 S.E.2.d 674 (1989)

Status: DECIDED

Docket Number: 46145

Parts: BELL, Justice.

Linked as:

Summary

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia -- 188 Ga. App. 81., Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., who dissents.

Summary

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia -- 188 Ga. App. 81., Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., who dissents.

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Jo Avery Crowder, Marva Jones Brooks, Mary Carole Cooney, for appellees.Billy E. Moore, McNally, Fox, Mahler & Cameron, Patrick J. Fox, for appellant.

In this case the plaintiff, John Self, contends that certain language in the charter of the City of Atlanta waives the city's sovereign immunity in a personal-injury action arising from a motor-vehicle collision. In Self v. City of Atlanta, 188 Ga. App. 81 (372 SE2d 283) (1988), the Court of Appeals determined that the language in question does not waive the city's immunity. Self then applied for a writ of certiorari, which we granted to consider this issue. For the reasons that we shall give in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The language at issue is found in Section 1-102 (a) of the city charter of Atlanta, Ga. L. 1973, pp. 2188, 2190, which provides that the city "may sue and be sued, and plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity and in all action [sic] whatsoever . . . ." The present controversy over the effect of this language (hereafter, the "sue and be sued" language) has its origin in a motor-vehicle collision that occurred between a van driven by Self and a waste-treatment sludge truck driven by a city employee. Self, who was severely injured by the collision, filed suit for damages, naming the city as a defendant. The city admitted that it had $1000 in self-insurance liability, but moved for summary judgment regarding any additional liability. As one ground of its motion, the city asserted the defense of sovereign immunity. Self responded to that assertion with an argument that the "sue and be sued" language waived the city's sovereign immunity. Cf. Medical Center Hosp. Auth. v. Andrews, 250 Ga. 424 (297 SE2d 28) (1982); McCafferty v. Medical College of Ga., 249 Ga. 62 (287 SE2d 171) (1982); Nat. Dist. Co. v. Dept. of Transp., 248 Ga. 451 (283 SE2d 470) (1981); Busbee v. American Assn. of Univ. Professors, 212 Ga. 729 (95 SE2d 659) (1956). But cf. McCafferty, supra, 249 Ga. at 73-74 (addendum on motion for rehearing); Knowles, supra, 212 Ga. at 734; Tounsel v. State Highway Dept., 251 Ga. 643 (2) (309 SE2d 126) (1983), and that the suit was pending before the effective date of OCGA 36-33-1 (a). Accordingly, we do not consider those provisions.