BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICEMEN\'S PENSION FUND OF ATLANTA et al. v. CHRISTY., 246 Ga. 553, 272 S.E.2.d 288 (1980)

Status: ARGUED

Docket Number: 36446

Parts: MARSHALL, Justice.

Linked as:

Summary

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia -- 154 Ga. App. 488 (269 SE2d 33) (1980)., Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Summary

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia -- 154 Ga. App. 488 (269 SE2d 33) (1980)., Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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Walter E. Sumner, amicus curiae.Ferrin Y. Mathews, Malcolm J. Hall, Irmina Rivero Owens, Marva Jones Brooks, for appellants.

We granted certiorari in this case to review the holdings of the Court of Appeals, that the phrase "in line of duty" in the provision for in-line-of-duty disability pensions in the Act establishing the Policemen's Pension Fund of Atlanta (Ga. L. 1933, p. 213; as amended) means the same as "arises out of and in the course of employment" under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act (Code 114-102), and that the appellee-claimant's injuries were in fact received "in line of duty," as that phrase had been construed.

1. We agree with the Court of Appeals' construction of the phrase "in line of duty," but deem it necessary to address an issue not expressly considered by that court, i.e., the effect of 23 of the 1933 Act (which has never been expressly repealed), which provides: "This Act shall not be affected [by?] nor shall it affect any of the provisions of any workmen's compensation law or other similar laws."

Since a strict and literal construction of the above provision standing alone would seem to require a result contrary to that reached by the Court of Appeals, we must examine some principles of statutory construction to determine the effect of the entire statute on the issue here involved. Initially, we note that the decisions of the courts of other states are mere opinions, which are not binding upon this court and will be followed only in case this court considers them sound and sees fit to follow them. Thompson v. Eastern Air Lines, 214 Ga. 240, 242 (104 SE2d 230) (1958) and cits. "In construing statutes subsequent acts of the legislature on the same subject may be considered." Wingfield v. Kutres, 111 Ga. App. 234,236 (141 SE2d 220) (1965). In construing the very Act in issue now, the Court of Appeals held that "[g]iving to the act the liberal construction to which it is entitled in view of the beneficent purpose for which it was enacted [Cits.], [a] provision, being restrictive of the rights granted by the act generally, must be strictly construed and its application to the provisions of the law . . . will not be extended to limit the right of a member of the policemen's pension fund to draw a pension on account of permanent disability as provided in Section IV of the act."

Our holding is not to the effect that 23 of the 1933 Act is of no force and effect under any circumstances. It may well be that its intent was to prevent the large-scale incorporation of another body of law into the Act, which may not have been congruous with the purposes and the operation of the Act. In any event, we do not consider our construction of the Act as a total disregard of 23, but rather an engrafting of a limited yet established body of law onto the phrase "in line of duty," to fill a gap left by the General Assembly's failure to define such phrase. We deem such construction not to do violence to the statute as a whole, nor to existing case and statutory laws, as set out hereinabove. Rather, by giving the phrase the broader meaning encompassed within the Workers' Compensation Act, we have, we believe, implemented the General Assembly's express policy of a liberal construction to effect the Act's purposes.

2. We also agree with the Court of Appeals' holding that the facts established by the appellee brought this case within the rule of the Workers' Compensation case of Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Bolen, 106 Ga. App. 684, 687 (127 SE2d 832) (1962). The facts show that the appellee was subject to be called to duty on a 24-hour basis; that Rule 1.07 of the police department provided that "An officer appearing in public in uniform, though off duty, will be considered on duty . . ."; that the appellee was allowed to take the police motorcycle home for the mutual benefit of himself and the city; that he was riding on the city police motorcycle in uniform at the time of the collision, which was not caused by his negligence or misconduct; that the collision occurred on the most direct route from his home to his assigned duty post for the day, en route to which he was traveling; that the appellee was within 30 minutes of his assigned duty post at the time of the collision and that he met the conditions for being "in the line of duty" as told to him and the other motorcycle officers by the supervisor of the motorcycle patrolmen, i.e., (1) proceeding from home to his assigned duty post for the day, (2) on his police motorcycle in uniform, (3) within 30 minutes of his assigned duty post. The argument that there was no benefit to the city in terms of increased police presence and availability for emergency duty while the appellee was still outside the city limits of Atlanta, hence without jurisdiction to make arrests, etc., is an attempt to unduly narrow the definition of "in line of duty" above approved. The availability of the motorcycle at the appellee's home made him more readily available to quicker answering of calls to duty, to which he was subject for 24 hours a day. Even while he was outside the city limits, he was at a place where it was necessary to be in order to fulfil his duties as a policeman, i.e., on a direct route to his assigned duty post from his home, where he had taken the motorcycle with the department's permission and approval.

Robert W. Hassett, Edward T. M. Garland, for appellee.

1980